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Abstract: Linguistic inferences have traditionally been studied and categorized in several 
categories, such as entailments, implicatures or presuppositions. This typology is mostly 
based on traditional linguistic means, such as introspective judgments about phrases occurring 
in different constructions, in different conversational contexts. More recently, the processing 
properties of these inferences have also been studied (see, e.g., recent work showing that 
scalar implicatures is a costly phenomenon). Our focus is on free choice permission, a 
phenomenon by which conjunctive inferences are unexpectedly added to disjunctive 
sentences. For instance, a sentence such as “Mary is allowed to eat an ice-cream or a cake” is 
normally understood as granting permission both for eating an ice-cream and for eating a 
cake. We provide data from four processing studies, which show that, contrary to arguments 
coming from the theoretical literature, free choice inferences are different from scalar 
implicatures.  
Keywords: pragmatics; processing; free choice; scalar implicatures; inferences 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The meaning we attach to any utterance comes from two sources. First, the specific 
combination of the words that were pronounced feeds the application of grammatical, 
compositional rules. The implicit knowledge of these rules allows us to understand any of the 
infinite combinations of words that form a proper sentence. Thus, grammatical operations 
lead to the literal meaning of the sentence. Second, the sentence meaning may be enriched by 
taking into account extra-linguistic information, such as general rules of communication and 
social interaction, information about the context of the utterance or the assumed common 
knowledge between speaker and addressee. The application of these pragmatic processes 
leads to the formation of implicatures. Grice (1975) illustrates this distinction with an 
example along the following lines. Consider a letter of recommendation for a teaching 
position that would read as in (1): 
 
(1) Mr. Smith has beautiful handwriting, and he is neatly dressed at all times.  
 
This letter puts forward positive features of Smith. Yet, when we go beyond the literal 
meaning of it, it is clear that this letter is destructive for Smith’s application. Letters of 
recommendation are supposed to deliver the most relevant and positive information about the 
applicant. If we take into account this pragmatic rule, it follows that Smith is a poor teacher. 
This inference is called an implicature of the utterance. In this example, the distinction is 
sharp: the literal meaning is entirely positive about Smith, but pragmatic principles add 
negative implicatures. 
 
Implicatures have been traditionally studied by linguists and philosophers investigating 
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the divide between pragmatic principles and grammatical computations that allow people to 
derive the correct inferences (e.g., Ducrot, 1969; Grice, 1975; Horn, 1989; Levinson, 2000; 
Sperber & Wilson, 1995). More recently, psycholinguists have began to investigate how 
various sorts of inferences are processed, adding a new kind of data to the debates, and with 
the ultimate goal of understanding how pragmatic principles might be instantiated in the 
human language processor. The most extensive investigations have been conducted on a kind 
of inference that we introduce in Section 1.1, so-called “scalar implicatures” (e.g., Bott & 
Noveck, 2004; Bott, Bailey & Grodner, 2012; Breheny, Katsos & Williams, 2006; Huang & 
Snedeker, 2008; Grodner, Klein et al, 2010; Nieuwland, Ditman, Kuperberg, 2010; 
Tomlinson, Bailey, & Bott, 2013), but work has also been completed on manner implicatures 
(Bott, Frisson & Murphy, 2008) and presuppositions (Chemla & Bott, 2013). The experiments 
in this paper investigate another type of implicature, free choice inferences, which arise from 
disjunctive sentences. An example is shown in (2) below. 
 
(2) You can have chocolate cake or icecream. 
 
Permissive disjunctions like this imply that both choices are possible, chocolate cake and 
icecream in this case. We will report several properties of these inferences that have been 
used to demonstrate that they do not belong to the core, literal meaning. Besides empirical 
properties, linguists have proposed an argument from parsimony: it has been shown that 
standard models for scalar implicatures can accommodate free choice inferences with little 
ado. Specifically, free choice inferences are often accounted for as second order scalar 
implicatures (see Section 1.3). This view leads to a very clear processing prediction that we 
will test: free choice should come at a processing cost similar or more extreme than any 
observed for scalar implicatures (see Section 1.1.2). The four current experiments test this 
prediction. 
 
The significance of free choice inferences is twofold. First, from a theoretical perspective, 
it is natural to postulate a simple, boolean lexical entry for disjunctions. However, free choice 
challenges this assumption: conjunctive readings that arise in these contexts lack an 
explanation if natural language disjunction has a boolean disjunctive lexical meaning. We 
thus need to establish a convincing explanation for this phenomenon, and to motivate this 
explanation with independent empirical data. Second, free choice also plays a pivotal role in 
the typology of linguistic inferences. It has received both semantic and pragmatic accounts, 
and it has been assimilated to other widespread phenomena, like scalar implicatures (see 
section 1.3), of whose pragmatic or semantic status is at the core of the most lively debates in 
the theoretical literature. Hence, studies of free choice should inform us about semantics and 
pragmatics more broadly. Parallel arguments apply with respect to language processing. 
Understanding how free choice is processed is necessary if we are to understand processing of 
disjunction in general, and understanding whether we need separate processing mechanisms 
for a priori related phenomena informs us about the complexities of the linguistic processor. 
 
We start by introducing some background about scalar implicatures and their relevant 
processing properties. In the following section, we present current arguments that lead to treat 
free choice as a pragmatic phenomenon. In this section, we will present the similarity between 
free choice and scalar implicatures, and derive from this comparison a processing prediction. 
Finally, we present three experiments that test whether free choice inferences and scalar 
implicatures show similar processing patterns. 
 
1.1 Scalar implicatures 
	  	   3	  
 
1.1.1 Derivation 
 
Scalar implicatures are inferences that arise from the competition between an uttered 
sentence and a minimally different alternative that has not been uttered. Consider the example 
in (3). A sentence like (3) is naturally understood as implying that the sentence (4) is false. 
The reasoning supporting this inference relies on the assumption that, all things being equal, 
more informative sentences – like the alternative (4) – are to be preferred (Grice, 1975). The 
full derivation of the inference can be described in four steps.1 (i) The literal meaning of (3) is 
computed. (ii) The listener notices that (4) is strictly more informative than (3): if John read 
all the books he surely read some, but not the other way round. (iii) Thus, all things being 
equal, it would have been preferable to utter (4) instead of (3). (iv) Something prevented the 
speaker from uttering (4), presumably that it is false; hence the implicature in (3-b). 
 
 (3) John read some of the books. 
  a. Literal meaning: One can find books that John read.  
  b. Implicature: John did not read all the books. 
  Enriched resulting meaning: John read some but not all the books.  
 
 (4) John read all the books. 
 
1.1.2 The role of processing results 
 
Much of the psycholinguistic research on implicatures has focused on whether scalar 
implicatures occur automatically and by default (chiefly motivated by arguments from 
Levinson, 2000). Although our own study is not directly concerned with this issue, the results 
that have been obtained in these studies motivate our own hypotheses and design. We will 
therefore briefly review some of the main findings (see also Katsos and Cummins, 2010). 
 
According to default processing models of implicatures, scalar implicatures are derived 
on every occasion, and to interpret a sentence involving a scalar term without a scalar 
implicature requires cancelling the implicature component of the sentence. For example, to 
understand some to mean at least one and possibly more, requires first deriving the 
implicature associated with the scalar term, not all, and then cancelling this implicature, 
leaving only the literal meaning. This hypothesis was tested by Bott and Noveck (2004; see 
also Noveck & Posada, 2003) using a sentence verification task. Participants saw sentences 
that could be interpreted with or without the implicature. The sentences, e.g., some elephants 
are mammals, were such that whether the sentence is judged to be true depends on whether 
the participant derives the implicature. For example, with a scalar implicature the sentence is 
false, as in some [but not all] elephants are mammals. With the literal meaning on the other 
hand, the sentence is true, as in some [and in fact all] elephants are mammals. Bott and 
Noveck compared response times to the two types of responses and discovered that response 
times associated with implicatures were slower than to those with literal meanings, in direct 
contrast to the default model predictions. Bott, Bailey and Grodner (2012) expanded theses 
experiments to demonstrate that the effects were not due to a speed-accuracy trade-off 
strategy and that they obtained across different languages, with different control sentences. 
Furthermore, Chevallier et al. (2008) showed that the same delay can be found with scalar 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Spector (2003), van Rooij & Schulz (2004), Sauerland (2004), Francke (2011) and many others for 
refinements. 
	  	   4	  
implicatures associated with other items (the exclusive reading of or, rather than the not all 
reading attached to some), which suggests that the processing pattern is quite generally 
associated with scalar implicatures. In short, these experiments demonstrate that there is a 
cost associated to verifying sentences with its implicature compared to verifying it without its 
implicature. This cost has been interpreted as a signature of the processes needed to derive a 
scalar implicature. 
 
Similar findings have been revealed with other experimental techniques. For instance, 
Breheny, Katsos and Williams (2006) used self-paced reading experiments to show that the 
same phrase takes more time to process in a context in which it triggers a scalar implicature 
than in contexts in which it does not, and, Huang and Snedeker (2009) came to the same 
conclusion using a visual world paradigm (but see, Grodner, Klein, Carbury, & Tanenhaus, 
2010). In short, there is a large range of evidence demonstrating that deriving scalar 
implicatures carries a cost. This cost has been used to argue against a default view of scalar 
implicature and, more generally, to answer questions about whether reasoning about 
alternatives should be understood as a late process or as an earlier pre-compiled operation. In 
the long run, these techniques may also be used to tease apart prominent approaches to scalar 
implicatures (e.g., Gricean, pragmatic approaches à la Spector, 2003, van Rooij & Schulz, 
2004, Sauerland, 2004, Franke, 2011 and grammatical approaches à la Chierchia, 2004, Fox, 
2007, Chierchia, Fox & Spector, 2008).  
 
Our study was not designed to address such issues, however. Instead, we will target the 
comparison between scalar implicatures and free choice inferences. For these purposes we 
simply wish to establish that it takes time for scalar implicature interpretations to become 
available, and not be concerned with theoretical interpretations of these findings. In the 
following section, we will derive from this comparative approach a strong processing 
prediction for free choice inferences. 
 
1.2 Free choice inferences 
 
Free choice is the term used to describe a class of sentences in which disjunctions seem to 
be interpreted conjunctively (Kamp 1973, 1978). For instance, every sentence in (5)-(8) is 
disjunctive in nature (either because of the presence of a disjunction or because of the 
presence of a conjunction under a negation). Nonetheless, each of them gives rise to the 
conjunction of the inferences reported in the corresponding a and b items. In fact, these 
conjunctive inferences arise systematically when the disjunction is embedded in some specific 
linguistic environments. The case that will be most important is the one in (5) where a 
disjunction is embedded under an existential deontic modal (is allowed). This is also the 
source of the name of the phenomenon: by granting a disjunctive permission, it happens that 
free choice is given as to which of the two disjunctive alternatives is permissible. 
 
(5) Mary is allowed to eat an apple or a pear.  
 a. ⇒ Mary is allowed to eat an apple. 
 b. ⇒ Mary is allowed to eat a pear. 
(6) Bill may be in the kitchen or in the bathroom. 
 a. ⇒ Bill may be in the kitchen.  
 b. ⇒ Bill may be in the bathroom. 
(7) Mary does not have to do the homework and the reading.  
 a. ⇒ Mary does not have to do the homework. 
 b. ⇒ Mary does not have to do the reading.  
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(8) None of the students decided to take the in-class exam. Some students wrote an essay or 
did the homework. 
 a. ⇒ Some students wrote an essay.  
 b. ⇒ Some students did the homework. 
 
The conjunctions of inferences in the examples above are not explained by the standard, 
Boolean interpretation of a disjunction. Consider the binary truth table associated with or. The 
sentence is true when one or other of the disjuncts is true; but it is not the case that both 
disjuncts2 must be true to make the sentence true. Indeed, in most environments quite the 
opposite is implied. For example, John speaks German or Dutch normally implies that John 
does not speak both languages. Yet in the free choice examples above, the sentences are 
interpreted as allowing both “disjuncts” to be true. For example, Mary is allowed to eat an 
apple or a pear suggests that Mary is allowed to eat an apple and that Mary is allowed to eat a 
pear (whichever option she prefers).3 The free choice interpretation therefore involves 
additional meaning beyond the standard disjunction. 
  
Dominant accounts of free choice assimilate the phenomenon with scalar implicatures. 
These scalar implicature approaches are our main target, and we will discuss this class of 
theories in the next section, but we mention immediately that one of their advantages is that 
they allow us to maintain standard assumptions about disjunctions and modals. Some 
researchers have argued, however, that free choice is so robust that they warrant a 
reassessment of basic, semantic assumptions about disjunction and modals. Zimmermamn 
(2000), Geurts (2005), Simons (2005), and Alonso-Ovalle (2008), for instance, base their 
analysis of free choice inferences on a re-analysis of disjunctions, as in A or B, not as boolean 
connectives, but as means to construct lists of objects ({A, B}). Others start from a refinement 
of the contribution of the modal verb. For example, the accounts offered by Lewis (1979), 
Veltmann (1996) and van Rooij (2006) propose an explanation by trying to equate 
(semantically or pragmatically) John is allowed to do A with some conditional of the form If 
John does A, then the law would be respected.  
 
Scalar implicature accounts of free choice thus rely on standard assumptions about the 
semantics of basic language units, while alternative accounts have to rely on modifications of 
these assumptions. We take this conservative aspect of scalar implicature accounts as an 
advantage. Let us make two additional general observations in favor of scalar implicature 
approaches. First, one can show that free choice inferences can be reproduced with 
expressions of disjunctions that do not involve actual disjunctions, as is the case when a 
conjunction occurs in the scope of negation (recall that not(A and B) is equivalent to (not A) 
or (not B)). Similarly, free choice inferences can be reproduced with a range of existential 
operators, beyond permissibility modals (see e.g., (8) above). Hence, if one had to account for 
free choice by modifying the semantics of disjunction or of modal verbs, the consequences on 
other instances of free choice would have to be investigated, which may involve revisiting the 
lexical semantics of other operators each time. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 We will use “disjunct” in a liberal manner: whenever a sentence contains a disjunction, we will refer to the 
sentence obtained by keeping one or the other of the two sides of the disjunction as a “disjunct”. 
3 We will not be concerned with the exclusive reading of the disjunction which may also arise in parallel of free 
choice, leading to the inference that if Mary is allowed to choose her preferred option (free choice), she cannot 
elect both options at the same time (exclusive reading). The two inferences are independent: one may arise 
without the other, and their source may be different. The second one plays no role in our experiments because it 
is systematically verified. We will stay away from this inference as much as possible to avoid confusion. 
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Second, free choice is cancellable, in a Gricean (and post-Gricean) sense. For example, 
although (5) is normally understood as implying (5)a and (5)b, this is not necessary and the 
following discourse is entirely natural: Mary is allowed to eat an apple or a pear, although I 
can’t remember which. This type of cancellation can in principle be explained in many ways 
(see in particular Zimmermann, 2000, which discusses cancellation carefully as a signal of an 
ambiguity). However, it is difficult to disregard the similarity it creates between free choice 
and scalar implicatures (e.g., the status of the discourse above is similar to the following one 
in which the not all scalar implicature is cancelled: Mary read some of the books, but I can’t 
tell if she read them all).  
 
Overall, the arguments make a scalar implicature account of free choice both economical 
and plausible. Our goal in this study is to evaluate them on new grounds, namely the 
processing predictions they make. In the next section we explain how theories of scalar 
implicatures explain free choice. 
 
1.3 Free choice inferences as scalar implicatures 
 
Recently, linguists showed that formal models used to derive scalar implicatures can be 
adapted to account for free choice inferences (inspired by Kratzer and Shimoyama, 2002, see 
Schultz, 2005, Klinedinst, 2006, Fox, 2007, Chemla 2008, 2010, Alonso-Ovalle, 2008, 
Franke, 2011, for various implementations). In most cases, the idea is to treat free choice 
inferences as second order scalar implicatures in the following sense. Standard scalar 
implicatures enrich the meaning of an utterance by negating some alternatives. For example, 
if the speaker said some, then all can be negated, as in John read some of the books. Second-
order scalar implicatures may enrich the meaning of an utterance by negating the enriched 
version of its alternatives. In other words, for what we call second-order implicatures, not 
only alternative sentences are considered, but the implicatures of these alternatives are also 
taken into account.  
 
For example, consider the following derivation of free choice for (5) above, Mary is 
allowed to eat an apple or a pear. First, the alternatives of this sentence are given in (9). They 
are all stronger than (5), but we cannot negate both a and b consistently (there would be no 
permission left) and there would be no reason to negate one rather than the other. Hence, we 
would simply only negate the c alternative at this point: Mary is not allowed to eat both an 
apple and an icecream at the same time (see footnote 3). 
 
(9) a. Mary is allowed to eat an apple.  
 b. Mary is allowed to eat a pear.  
 c. Mary is allowed to eat an apple and a pear. 
 
However, these alternatives may also be enriched with their own scalar implicatures. (9-a) 
with the negation of (9-b) becomes (10-a), and similarly (9-b) with the negation of (9-a) 
becomes (10-b). (For simplicity, we can ignore the last alternative (9-c) at this stage: it 
remains unchanged and plays no further role. This inference does play quite an important role, 
however, for unembedded disjunction. Schematically, the corresponding inference for “A or 
B” is “not (A and B)”, and it blocks the inferences “A” and “B” at a later stage). 
 
(10) a. Mary is allowed to eat an apple, but she’s not allowed to eat a pear.  
 b. Mary is allowed to eat a pear, but she’s not allowed to eat an apple.  
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Now, we need to do some computations. (10-a) and (10-b) are stronger than (5), we thus 
get an overall meaning for the original sentence (5) with them negated as implicatures. We 
obtain the following: (i) Mary is allowed to eat an apple or a pear (literal meaning of (5)), but 
(ii) it’s not the case that she’s allowed to eat an apple and disallowed to eat a pear (negation of 
(10-a)), and (iii) it’s not the case that she’s allowed to eat a pear and disallowed to eat an 
apple (negation of (10-b)). This is equivalent to her being allowed to have any of the two 
(although possibly not the two of them at once, if we include the negation of (9-c)). 
 
In a nutshell, the above theory derives free choice inferences as second-order scalar 
implicatures. It does not make any non-standard assumptions about disjunctions or other 
linguistic terms. It explains why free choice inferences are optional (just like other scalar 
implicatures). Finally, it can be shown to explain why free choice arises in some contexts, but 
not, for instance, with unembedded disjunctions. 
 
1.4 Prediction 
 
Let us take stock. We introduced scalar implicatures, an optional type of inference, and 
reported results showing that their derivation comes at some cost. We introduced free choice 
inferences, and explained that they could be accounted for as second order scalar 
implicatures. This view leads to a straightforward prediction about free choice inferences: if 
free choice inferences are “double” scalar implicatures, as suggested above, there should be 
an equal or greater cost to deriving free choice relative to the literal meaning (as there are 
with scalar implicatures). In short, free choice inferences should take longer to process than 
the simpler, logical disjunction. We next describe four experiments that test this hypothesis. 
1.5 Overview of Experiments 
Our experiments were based on the paradigm developed by Bott and Noveck (2004). 
Participants completed a sentence verification task in which they read sentences and 
responded with “true” or “false”. Crucially, the experimental sentences could be understood 
with either a free choice interpretation or a literal interpretation, just as sentences in Bott and 
Noveck could be understood with either a scalar implicature or a literal interpretation. The 
sentences were of the form, X is allowed to save A or B, where X was the name of a person 
and A and B were nouns. A cover story was constructed in which the destruction of the planet 
was described as imminent but that certain people were allowed to save certain types of 
objects. Specifically, zoologists were allowed to save living creatures and engineers were 
allowed to save artificial objects. An example of one of the sentences was, “Derek-the-
engineer is allowed to save a hammer or a lion.” According to the cover story, a free choice 
interpretation would result in a false proposition (engineers are not allowed to save lions) 
whereas a literal interpretation would result in a true proposition (engineers are allowed to 
save hammers). 
We conducted four experiments investigating the time course of free choice inferences. 
In each case we compared free choice or interpretations against literal or interpretations. 
Experiments 1, 2, and 4 were free choice versions of experiments from Bott and Noveck, 
(2004). In Experiment 1 participants were able to choose whether they responded with free 
choice or literal interpretations. In Experiment 2 we introduced a training context so that half 
the participants were biased towards a free choice response and half were biased towards a 
literal response. In Experiment 3, we added a direct test of scalar implicature to the free 
choice paradigm which allowed us to compare the two phenomena based on data from the 
same experimental run. Finally, in Experiment 4, we manipulated the time available for 
	  	   8	  
participants to respond. If free choice inferences are an enriched form of the basic disjunction 
derived using similar procedures as scalar implicatures, strong free choice responses should 
be slower than weak, literal responses, just like strong scalar implicature responses are slower 
than corresponding weak, literal responses. 
Our choice of methodology was guided by our goal: evaluate scalar implicature theory of 
free choice on processing grounds. Thus, we extended the seminal paradigm used to study the 
processing of scalar implicatures to study free choice. Indeed, while we have described the 
specifics of free choice and scalar implicature derivation, our main results are comparative 
and they will largely hold independently of what we assumed to be the underlying 
mechanisms behind either type of inference; all that matters for the present purposes is 
whether we observe the same pattern of results, that is, whether the processing mechanisms 
are similar or different.  
 
2. Experiment 1 
Participants classified experimental sentences of the form described above – true under 
their literal meaning, false under a free choice interpretation. We refer to the two readings as 
literal or free choice respectively.4 In this experiment participants were not told which 
interpretation of the experimental sentences was “correct”; they simply chose the 
interpretation they felt was the most appropriate. We then compared response times for false 
response (corresponding to strong, free choice interpretations) against true responses (weak, 
literal interpretations). If free choice interpretations are derived in similar way as scalar 
implicatures, free choice interpretations should be delayed relative to the literal 
interpretations. 
Participants also saw a range of control sentences to prevent strategies and ensure that the 
cover story was appropriately understood. The control sentences were either double, in which 
case they contained two nouns conjoined by or, or they were single, and contained only one 
noun. There were two phases to the experiment: a practice phase and an experimental phase. 
During the practice phase participants classified control sentences and received feedback 
indicating whether they were correct or incorrect. Experimental sentences were not presented 
in the practice phase. In the experimental phase, both types of sentences were presented but 
no feedback was provided.  
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants 
Forty-six participants from Cardiff University completed the experiment for course credit 
or payment. Two were eliminated from the analysis because they failed to adequately respond 
to the control questions (see below). 
2.1.2 Design and materials 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 There are two worries with this terminology that we would like to make explicit before using it. First, the word 
literal is biased towards the scalar implicature view. This view is our main target, however, and this terminology 
should thus help keep the relevant comparison between the two phenomena more visible. Second, even when 
one is concerned with scalar implicature, the description of the weak interpretation as the literal meaning is 
biased towards a Gricean account of the phenomenon, which is now highly debated. We use this terminology for 
simplicity and without committing ourselves to a contribution to this debate. 
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Participants saw sentences from three conditions, as illustrated in Table 1. First, they saw 
experimental sentences, in which the veracity varied depending on whether the participant 
derived the free choice or the weak interpretation. Experimental sentences always included 
two nouns separated by or. There were two experimental sentences per item; one in which the 
first disjunct was true and one in which the second disjunct was true, as in S1 and S2 in Table 
1. (Here and elsewhere, we use a shortcut: “disjuncts” may refer to full sentences, obtained 
from a sentence containing a disjunction by replacing this disjunction to one or the other of its 
two sides. It is in that sense that a “disjunct” may be true or false). Second, double control 
sentences, which contained two nouns, just as in the experimental sentences, but the two 
disjuncts were either both true, as in S3, or both false, as in S4 (i.e., the nouns in the disjuncts 
were either both congruent or both incongruent with the special expertise introduced in the 
subject of the sentence, zoologist or engineer). Finally, there were single control sentences, 
which always contained only one noun. These could be either true, as in S5 or S6, or false, as 
in S7 or S8.  
 
Condition Sentence 
Number 
Example Correct 
response 
Experimental S1 Beverly-the-engineer is allowed to save a hammer or 
a lion. 
T/F 
S2 Essie-the-engineer is allowed to save a kangaroo or 
a fork. 
F/T 
Double 
control 
S3 Federico-the-engineer is allowed to save a hammer 
or a fork. 
T 
S4 Martina-the-engineer is allowed to save a lion or a 
kangaroo. 
F 
Single 
control 
S5 Maynard-the-engineer is allowed to save a hammer. T 
S6 Alejandra-the-engineer is allowed to save a fork. T 
S7 Cheryl-the-engineer is allowed to save a lion. F 
S8 Rocco-the-engineer is allowed to save a kangaroo. F 
 
Table 1. Sentence types and examples.  
 
Items consisted of quadruplets of four nouns, two of which were artifact nouns and two 
were living creatures. For example, the quadruplets hammer-fork-lion-kangaroo formed one 
item. To form the items, we compiled a list of 80 artifact nouns and 80 living creature nouns. 
From these, we selected 40 item bases consisting of two artifact nouns and two living 
creatures. Twenty of the quadruplets were arbitrarily assigned to form zoologist sentences and 
20 to form engineer sentences. Each noun from a given quadruplets was therefore always 
paired with the name of an engineer/zoologist as appropriate throughout the experiment. Half 
of the item bases were allocated to the practice phase and half to the experimental phase. 
Sentences were constructed by combining a name and item-appropriate profession as the 
subject, e.g., “Beverly-the-engineer” or “David-the-zoologist”, together with the verb 
segment, “is allowed to save a”, and one or two nouns. In the experimental phase, each noun 
from the item base was used to form one of the single control sentences, as in S5 to S8. The 
pair of artifact nouns and the pair of living creature nouns each formed one of the double 
control sentences, S3 and S4 respectively. Finally, one artifact noun and one living creature 
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noun was used to form one of the experimental sentences, S1, and the other pair of 
artifact/creature nouns formed the other experimental sentence, S2. In the practice phase, 
there were also 20 bases but only four sentences were formed from each base, the two double 
controls (S3 and S4) and two of the single controls (S5 and S7). 
In the experimental phase then, there were 20 item bases and they formed 20 by 8 = 160 
sentences. Of these, 40 were experimental sentences, 40 were double control sentences and 80 
were single control sentences. In the practice phase there were 20 item bases but only 4 
sentences from each base, hence only 80 sentences. All participants saw all items. The 
assignment of response keys to response options was randomized for each participant. 
2.1.3 Procedure 
Participants were first presented with the cover story about the imminent destruction of the 
earth and its evacuation. They were told about engineers and zoologists, each of whom were 
allowed to take one and only one object away with them, corresponding to their specialty.5 
The crucial part of the cover story read, “A zoologist may save a living creature, whatever 
creature he or she wants. An engineer would not be allowed to save a living creature, but he 
or she may be allowed to save any kind of man-made, or artificial, object.” They were then 
told that they would see sentences on the screen and that they needed to say whether the 
sentences were true or false according to their general knowledge and the preceding scenario.  
After reading the cover story participants progressed onto the practice phase of the 
experiment. Here, they read each sentence, made a response and then received corrective 
feedback. Sentences were presented in segments in the centre of the screen. There were seven 
segments for each sentence. The first segment was the name-profession combination, e.g., 
“Rocco-the-engineer”, which was presented for 750ms (250ms per word), the next five 
segments were the following five words in the sentence, each presented for 250ms, and the 
final segment was the noun or disjunction component, e.g., “lion” or “lion or kangaroo.” The 
final segment was left on screen until the participant made a response. RTs were taken from 
the onset of the final segment. Feedback consisted of the words, “correct” or “incorrect” as 
appropriate. After the practice phase participants were told to take a short break before 
commencing the experimental phase. The procedure was the same in the experimental phase 
except that feedback was not provided. 
2.2 Results 
2.2.1 Data treatment 
Participants were removed if they failed to respond with 0.75 proportion correct on the 
control sentences. We reasoned that if they were not responding accurately to the control 
sentences they could have found alternative strategies to answer the experimental sentences. 
This criterion led to the removal of two participants. 
We applied a log transformation to RTs to conform to the assumptions of parametric tests. 
2.2.2 Inferential analysis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This particular part of the cover story was designed to make the independent “exclusive” inference driven by 
the disjunction true across all items, no matter what reading, literal or free choice, participants would draw (see 
footnote 3). 
	  	   11	  
For all of the experiments presented in this article we combined items and participants as 
crossed random effects in a linear mixed-effects regression model (see Baayen, Davidson, & 
Bates, 2008) computed using the lmer function in R (Bates et al., 2011). Parametric models 
were assumed for RT data and logit models for choice proportions. We used models with 
random slopes and intercepts for participants/items when the factors were repeated measures, 
and random intercepts when they were between participants/items. This applied to main 
effects and interactions (see Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). On two occasions the 
maximal model failed to converge; we describe how we dealt with this in the text. We 
computed p-values by performing likelihood ratio tests in which the deviance of a model 
containing the fixed effect was compared with an otherwise identical model without the fixed 
effect.  
2.2.3 Choice proportions 
Control sentences were answered very accurately overall M = .93, SD = .039, illustrating 
that participants understood the task and the cover story. In the experimental sentences, free 
choice responses (false) were the majority, M = .66 SD = .33. The difference between the 
proportion of dominant (false) responses in the experimental sentences and the proportion 
accurate in the control sentences was significant, χ2 (1)  = 12.98, p < .001, β = 1.53, SE = 
0.37, t = 4.14, suggesting that multiple interpretations were available for the experimental 
sentences. 
We also examined the distribution of responses to the experimental sentences. Out of 44 
participants, 4 responded entirely with free choice responses and 1 responded entirely with 
literal responses. The remaining participants exhibited a skewed distribution towards free 
choice responding (as suggested by the mean accuracy reported above). 
2.2.4 Response Times 
Figure 1 shows the pattern of RTs for the correct responses to all five types of sentences. 
For experimental sentences, false responses (free choice) appear faster than true responses but 
for the control sentences, the reverse is true. 
An omnibus analysis comparing sentence type (single control, double control, 
experimental) against response type (true vs false)6 revealed a significant interaction between 
sentence type and response type, χ2 (2) = 14.62, p < .001, β = 0.054, SE = 0.016, t = 3.33. 
Analysis of the component effects revealed the significant interaction was driven by a smaller 
difference between true and false interpretations in the experimental sentences than between 
true and false in the control sentences. Specifically, there were no interactions between true 
and false responses and the double and single control sentences, χ2 < 1, but there were 
significant differences between response types when comparing the experimental sentences 
with the single control sentences, χ2 (1)  = 10.15, p = .0014, β = .054, SE = 0.016, t =3.29, 
and the double control sentences, χ2 (1) = 8.33, p = .0039.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The 3 by 2 maximal mixed model did not converge. We therefore removed the random effect that contributed 
least to the model fits and whose omission allowed convergence (following the recommendation in Barr et al., 
2013). In this analysis it was the subject random slope for the sentence type by response type interaction for 
participants. The analysis from the restricted model is reported in the text. We also tested a model that combined 
the single and double control sentences into a single level and tested the 2 by 2 interaction of sentence type 
(experimental vs. control) by response type (true vs false). This model converged and the appropriate 
comparison was significant, χ2 (1) = 11.98, p <.001, β = 0.058, SE = 0.016, t = 3.71. 
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In the experimental condition, the mean reaction time for free-choice response was 
numerically smaller than the mean for literal responses, but was not significant, χ2 (1) = 1.23, 
p =0.27, β = 0.037, SE = 0.029, t =1.31. For control sentences true responses were faster than 
false responses, χ2 (1)  = 13.00, p < .001, β = 0.035, SE = 0.0084, t =4.12. 
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Figure 1. Response times for Experiment 1. Strong, free choice interpretations are false 
responses to the experimental sentences; weak, literal interpretations are true responses to the 
experimental sentences. Control sentence results are RTs to correct responses. Error bars 
correspond to the standard error of the mean. 
 
To make a more direct comparison between our results and those of Bott and Noveck 
(2004), we examined the confidence intervals around the difference between literal and free 
choice responses for our experimental sentences, and compared this against the reported 
difference in Bott and Noveck. We observed a 104ms advantage for free choice responses, 
with 95% (2-tailed) confidence intervals of  [295ms, -87ms]. Thus, we can be 95% confident 
that free choice responses (the inference) were no more than 87ms slower than literal 
responses. In comparison, Bott and Noveck observed implicature responses (the inference) to 
be approximately 600ms slower than literal responses in Experiment 3 (the experiment with 
the most comparable design to this one).  
2.3 Discussion 
Experiment 1 was designed to test whether free choice interpretations were processed in a 
similar way to scalar implicatures. If so, we would have expected faster literal responses than 
free choice responses. We found no evidence that this was the case, however. On the contrary, 
relative to control sentences, we found significantly faster free choice responses than literal 
responses. Furthermore, confidence intervals indicated that the true difference between free 
choice and literal responses is unlikely to be of a comparable size and direction to those of 
scalar implicatures (Bott & Noveck, 2004).  
Experiment 1 used a design in which participants were free to choose their interpretation of 
the experimental sentences. Allowing participants to choose, however, results in a design in 
which error responses are conflated with veridical responses. This introduces noise into the 
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analysis and consequently lowers the power of the experiment to detect differences across 
interpretations. Furthermore, the design is quasi-experimental, in that participants and items 
are not randomly allocated to levels of the experimental factor. In Experiment 2 we used a 
cleaner design in which participants were presented with a context that could be either biased 
towards a free choice response or a literal response (similar to Experiment 1 of Bott & 
Noveck, 2004). 
3. Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2 participants also classified sentences involving zoologists and engineers. 
However, participants now received feedback on the experimental sentences as well as the 
control sentences. One group of participants received corrective feedback encouraging the 
free choice interpretation of the experimental sentences, and the other group received 
feedback encouraging the literal interpretation. Thus, participants who were in the free choice 
group were trained to respond “false” to the experimental sentences whereas those in the 
literal group were trained to respond “true”. The feedback occurred in the practice phase at 
the same time as participants received feedback on the control sentences. The comparison of 
interest was between true responses to the experimental sentences (from the literal group) and 
false responses to the experimental sentences (from the free choice group).7 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants 
Sixty-seven participants from Cardiff University completed the experiment for course 
credit or payment. Seven participants were removed from the analysis because they failed to 
reach the inclusion criterion of 0.75 proportion correct on the control sentences. Four of these 
were from the literal group and three from the free choice group.  
3.1.2 Design, materials and procedure. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 If training was completely effective in determining an interpretation for a particular kind of structure, 
participants from the literal group and from the free choice group should have a literal interpretation and a free 
choice interpretation, respectively, not only for the experimental sentences but for the control sentences as well. 
The only difference between control and experimental sentences then is that true/false responses for the controls 
do not discriminate between the two possible interpretations. As a result, any RT effect of interpretation should 
be visible between groups both in experimental sentences and in control sentences. What we find, however, is 
that response patterns for control and experimental sentences are different. We believe that this protects our 
interpretation of the results and justify a posteriori our use of control sentences. We mention two possible 
interpretations for the absence of interpretation effects on control and experimental results. 
(i) In experimental conditions we were able to clean the data corresponding to 'wrong' interpretations (e.g., a free 
choice interpretation by a participant in the literal group would lead to a detectable false response and can be 
excluded). Hence, if anything, an effect of interpretation will be less poluted by noise in the analysis of 
experimental sentences. In the control conditions, however, there might be some proportions of 'wrong' 
interpretations, which would still lead to correct responses. As a result, the data from the control sentences can 
serve as a baseline for our effect, by virtue of being an impure version of our experimental conditions. Note that 
the same argument applies to experiments without training: there is even less ground to decide which 
interpretation participants adopted for the control conditions, so that these conditions can be used as the same 
type of impure baseline as in the experiments with training. 
(ii) Our results may be interpreted as evidence for the fact that there might be a coarse grained semantic analysis 
in this task so that, in control conditions, participants are able to detect that both interpretations lead to the same 
response without deriving any of these interpretations. Hence, they would be able to provide an answer without 
going through the derivation of any interpretation, at least in some occasions, and any effect of interpretation 
should be obscured. This interpretation also applies to experiments without training.  
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Participants underwent a training phase and an experimental phase, just as they did in 
Experiment 1. The difference was that during the training phase of Experiment 2, participants 
received feedback on the experimental as well as the control sentences. Participants from the 
free choice group received feedback indicating that the correct response to the experimental 
sentences was “false”, whereas participants from the literal group received feedback 
indicating that it was “true”. Feedback was corrective (“incorrect” or “correct”) but did not 
include a rationale. For example, if a participant from the free choice group responded “true” 
to an experimental sentence, the word, “incorrect” appeared on the screen. There was no 
difference between the feedback provided about responses to experimental sentences than to 
feedback about control sentences. 
Participants saw the same number of control trials as in Experiment 1 (80) but they also 
saw 20 experimental sentences. The experimental phase and all other aspects of the design 
were identical to that of Experiment 1.  
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Choice Proportions 
Accuracy was high and approximately equal across conditions, both for the control 
sentences, Mfc = .93, SD = .043, vs Mlit = .92, SD = .036, and for the experimental sentences, 
Mfc = .95, SD = .039, vs Mlit = .95, SD = .049. The training used to bias responses was 
therefore effective in both groups. 
3.2.2 Response times 
Figure 2 shows the pattern of RTs. For the experimental sentences, false (free choice) 
responses appear faster than true (literal) responses, but the reverse applies for the control 
sentences. The pattern therefore replicates Experiment 1. 
The omnibus analysis revealed a significant interaction between sentence type (control vs. 
experimental) and response (true or false)8, χ2 (2) = 25.00, p < .001, β = 0.012, SE = 0.0081, t 
= 4.97. For control sentences, true responses were significantly faster than false responses, 
χ2(1) = 8.90, p = .0029, β = 0.028, SE = .0089, t = 3.16, just as in Experiment 1, but for 
experimental sentences, false responses (free choice) were derived significantly faster than 
true (literal) responses, χ2 (1) = 23.89, p < .001, β = 0.12, SE = .024, t = 4.94. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The 3 by 2 maximal mixed model failed to converge. We followed the procedure we used in Experiment 1 and 
removed the random effect that contributed least to the model fit and whose removal led to convergence. In this 
case the item random slope for the sentence type by response interaction was removed. We also verified that the 
maximal model when the control conditions were combined into a single level was also significant, χ2 (1) = 
11.42, p <.001, β = 0.047, SE = 0.0096, t = 4.90, just as we did in Experiment 1. 	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Figure 2. Response times for Experiment 2. Free choice and literal results (respectively false 
and true responses to the experimental sentences) are the correct responses from the free 
choice and literal participants respectively. Control sentence results (double and single) are 
RTs to correct responses averaged across both groups of participants. Error bars correspond to 
the standard error of the mean. 
 
3.3 Discussion 
In Experiment 2 we biased participants towards interpreting the experimental sentences as 
either literal or free choice. The design had greater power than Experiment 1 and involved a 
complete experimental design in which items and participants were randomly allocated to 
experimental levels. We observed significantly faster free choice responses than literal 
responses, in contrast to a scalar implicature account of free choice. 
One limitation to our conclusions so far is that they have been based entirely on cross-
experimental comparisons: we have assumed that the results from our experiments are 
comparable to results from other sentence verification paradigms that tested scalar 
implicatures. This assumption may not be justified, however. Note for instance that our free 
choice verification task was based on a cover story, while standard implicature verification 
tasks are based on world knowledge. This difference allows for the possibility that scalar 
implicatures computed under our experimental conditions may not exhibit delayed responses 
compared to literal interpretations. In Experiment 3 we sought to remove this limitation by 
directly comparing scalar implicatures and free choice interpretations within the same 
experiment. 
 
4. Experiment 3 
In Experiment 3 participants undertook two sentence verification tasks in two experimental 
blocks. In one block, participants completed a scalar implicature task, whereas in the other 
block they completed a free choice task (with counter-balanced order). Our primary aim in 
this experiment was to test the interaction between weak and strong interpretations across the 
two phenomena, free choice and scalar implicature. We refer to the weak meaning as the 
literal meaning, and to the strong meaning (free choice or implicature, respectively) as the 
inference meaning. 
0 
200 
400 
600 
800 
1000 
1200 
1400 
1600 
1800 
2000 
Experimental Double Single 
R
es
po
ns
e 
Ti
m
e 
(m
s)
 
FALSE 
TRUE 
False 
True 
0 
200 
400 
600 
800 
1000 
1200 
1400 
1600 
1800 
2000 
Experimental Double Single 
R
es
po
ns
e 
Ti
m
e 
(m
s)
 
FALSE 
TRUE 
	  	   17	  
 
The free choice task was exactly the same as Experiment 2. The scalar task was similar 
to Bott and Noveck (2004) but modified to make it more comparable to the free choice task. 
In particular, the task now involved a cover story against which the truth values of the target 
sentences should be evaluated. As a result, we also avoided using the supercategory-
subcategory sentence frame (e.g., “some elephants are mammals”), which arguably creates 
odd sentences (see Magri, 2009, for theoretical discussions of conditions under which scalar 
implicatures in contradiction with common knowledge may create oddness). 
We chose to test the usual not all inference of some. There has been a suggestion that a 
more direct test would have been to test the exclusive inference associated with the 
disjunction (or). However, simple disjunctive sentences come with additional inferences 
(ignorance inferences about the disjunct, often called primary scalar implicatures, e.g., 
Spector 2003, Sauerland 2004, van Rooij and Schulz 2004) and some theorists have even 
disputed the possibility that this inference is a scalar implicature (e.g., Geurts 2005). Hence, 
the exclusive reading of simple disjunctions does not qualify as an appropriate, 
uncontroversial baseline for scalar implicature processing. The fact that it involves the same 
word (or) makes it a better candidate for superficial reasons only.  
Based on Bott and Noveck (2004)’s seminal idea, target sentences were true under their 
literal reading, and false under their inference reading. Whether a participant endorsed the 
literal or the implicature interpretation was determined by corrective feedback, in a similar 
way as in Experiment 2. One group of participants, the literal group, made true responses to 
the experimental sentences, and other participants, an inference group, made false responses 
to the experimental sentences. Participants were consistently literal (or inference) in both 
tasks, that is, the same set of participants made literal (or inference) responses in the free 
choice and the scalar tasks. If the results from the scalar task are consistent with previous 
studies, responses from the inference group should be longer than those from the literal group. 
More originally, if free choice inferences are double scalar implicatures, we should find a 
larger difference for free choice sentences, contrary to what we found in Experiments 1 and 2. 
4.1 Participants 
Forty-four Cardiff University students participated for course credit. Participants data 
were removed from a given task if accuracy on the control conditions was below 0.75 
proportion correct (as in Experiments 1 and 2).  The data from five participants were removed 
from the scalar task (two from the literal group) and seven from the free choice task (five 
from the literal group).  
4.2 Design and Materials. 
The design for the FC task was identical to Experiment 2.  The design for the scalar task 
was as follows.  
Participants made truth value judgments about sentences that involved a quantifier 
(some or all), an exemplar (either a bird or a plain terrestrial animal, henceforth an animal), 
and a verb (saved, killed, or infected). All sentences were of the from “[Quantifier] [exemplar] 
were [verb].” There was one type of experimental sentence and eight types of control 
sentence. Examples of each are shown in Table 2. Each of the 20 experimental sentences 
involved a different bird, and the birds assigned to the experimental sentences were not used 
in the control conditions. The birds and animals in the control sentences were drawn from a 
bank of 35 items with some repetition of items across conditions.  
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Label Example Truth Frequency 
Some-bird-saved [EXP] Some eagles were saved. T/F 20 
some-bird-killed Some starlings were killed. F 15 
some-bird-infected Some blackbirds were infected. T 15 
all-bird-saved All ducks were saved. T 10 
all-bird-killed All hens were killed. F 10 
all-bird-infected All robins were infected. F 10 
some-animal-killed Some antelopes were killed. T 5 
some-animal-infected Some foxes were infected. T 5 
all-animal-saved All ponies were saved. F 10 
 
Table 2. Sentence types and examples.  
 
The truth value of the sentences was determined by a cover story. This described a 
scenario in which a new virus had infected birds and animals. The important parts of the 
cover story were that (i) the virus infected only males (females were resistant), and (ii) the 
virus killed only animals (birds always survived). Consideration of the cover story reveals 
how the truth values shown in Table 2 are derived. For example, some starlings were infected 
is true because male starlings caught the virus. Crucially, whether the sentence is judged to be 
true depends on whether the scalar implicature was derived. For example, some eagles were 
saved could be read as true (because at least one eagle survived), or false (because all eagles 
survived).  
The control sentences were chosen to prevent participants predicting the correct answer 
to the experimental sentence without reading or combining the different segments. Thus, it 
was not possible to accurately predict whether the experimental sentences were true or false 
by relying on only the first part of the sentence, “Some [bird] …,” or only on the last part of 
the sentence, “… were saved.” The control sentences were of eight types. These were formed 
by varying the quantifier (some vs all), whether the subject was a bird or an animal, and 
whether the verb was saved, killed, or infected. Overall there were more false control 
sentences than true control sentences (45:35) (this might have introduced a small bias towards 
false responding in this task but, to forecast our results somewhat, we found facilitation of 
true response, not false responses, and hence the impact of this imbalance was minimal). 
The task included a practice phase and an experimental phase. During the practice 
phase, participants received feedback on their responses, but during the experimental phase 
they did not (just as in Experiments 1 and 2). The sentences were of the same form as those in 
the experimental phase but involved different items. Participants judged 40 sentences (half the 
number of the sentences in the experimental phase), broken down in approximately the same 
ratios as the experimental phase, e.g., there were ten experimental sentences, seven some-
bird-killed sentences, and eight some-bird-infected sentences. The interpretation of the 
experimental sentence was determined by the feedback provided in the practice phase. For 
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literal participants, feedback indicated that the experimental sentences were true, whereas for 
inference participants, feedback indicated that the sentences were false.  
Participants completed the free choice task and the scalar task. Participants were 
randomly assigned to a literal condition, in which case they completed the literal conditions of 
the free choice task and the scalar task, or the inference condition, in which case they 
completed the inference conditions of both tasks. The order in which participants completed 
the tasks was counter-balanced.  
Participants were told that they would be doing two sentence verification tasks but not 
that the two tasks were linked. After the first task was completed the experimenter started the 
next test by executing a different computer program. It was only after both tasks had ended, 
during the debriefing stage, that participants were told that there was a link between the two. 
 
 
Figure 3. Raw response times for the scalar task and the free choice task, Experiment 3. 
Incorrect responses have been removed. In the experimental conditions, true responses 
correspond to literal interpretations and false responses to inference interpretations. Error bars 
are the standard error of the mean.  
 
4.3 Scalar task results 
4.3.1 Choice proportions 
Performance was accurate across both training groups and differed very little. For the 
control sentences, Mlit = .93, SD = .036, vs Minf = .95, SD = .076, and for the experimental 
sentences, Mlit = .95, SD = .076, vs Minf = .94, SD = .096. The training used to bias responses 
was therefore effective in both groups. 
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4.3.2 Response times 
All incorrect responses and outliers were removed from the data analysis. Responses 
were considered outliers if they were greater than 10s. There were 12 outliers out of 3900 
responses.  
The left half of Figure 3 shows the results from the scalar implicature task. Participants 
appear to need longer to respond to the scalar inference (false) compared to the literal 
meaning, consistent with Bott and Noveck (2004) and others, but there is very little difference 
between the control conditions. This pattern was confirmed by a significant response type 
(true vs false) by sentence type (control vs experimental) interaction, χ2 (1) = 9.30, p = .0023, 
β = 0.068, SE = 0.022, t = 3.17.  
There was no significant difference between true (literal) vs false (scalar inference) on 
the experimental sentences, χ2 (1)  = 1.32, p = .25, β = 0.041, SE = .035, t = 1.19, but this 
might be expected because training was a between participants manipulation and we were 
consequently unable to subtract away individual participant variability (Bott & Noveck, 2004, 
used a within-subject design, and therefore did not suffer the same problem). The interaction 
we report above, in contrast, removes individual participant variability by estimating it from 
the control conditions. No significant difference was observed between true and false control 
conditions, χ2 (1)  = 1.12, p = .29, β = 0.011, SE = .011, t = 1.069. 
We also examined whether the order in which the participants completed the scalar task 
and free choice task had an effect on the results. No effects of order were apparent, however, 
χ2’s < 1. 
4.4 Free choice task results 
4.4.1 Choice proportions 
Accuracy was good overall and similar to Experiment 2 for the control sentences (Minf = 
.93, SD = .045, vs Mlit = .95, SD = .039) and for the experimental sentences (Minf = .93, SD = 
.079, vs Mlit = .97, SD = .035). 
4.4.2 Response times 
Incorrect responses and outliers were removed. There were two outliers. 
As with the scalar task, this resulted in a significant 2 by 2 interaction of response type 
(true vs false) and sentence type (control vs experimental sentences), χ2 (1)  = 6.05, p = .014, 
β = 0.040, SE = 0.013, t = 3.06. Analysis of the simple effects revealed no significant 
difference between false (free choice) and true (literal) for the experimental sentences, χ2 < 1, 
but there was a significant difference between true and false control conditions, χ2 (1) = 
19.49, p < .001, β = 0.056, SE = 0.010, t = 5.48.  
No main effects or interactions with order were present, χ2’s < 1.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 This could be considered unusual given the well-known bias against responding false. The most likely 
explanation for our failure to observe this effect is that we had a predominance of false control sentences in the 
scalar task (see the Method section), which offset any general bias against false responding. Note that any bias 
towards false responding would reduce the observed cost of a scalar implicature response, and so would work in 
the opposite direction to our hypothesis. 
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4.5. Comparison between scalar and free choice 
The main aim of the experiment was to compare the literal and inference responses 
across scalar and free choice tasks. The significant interactions within the scalar task and the 
free choice task suggests a three-way interaction between task (scalar vs free choice), 
sentence type (control vs experimental sentence) and interpretation (literal vs free choice). 
This was indeed the case: χ2 (1) = 7.028, p < .005, β = 0.086, SE = 0.028, t = 3.08. The 2 by 2 
interaction between task (scalar vs free choice) and interpretation (literal vs free choice) 
restricted to experimental conditions was not significant, χ2 < 1, however.  
To gain some statistical power, we conducted cross-experimental analyses between the 
scalar task of Experiment 3 and the free choice tasks of Experiments 2. While participants 
were clearly not assigned randomly across experiments, there is little chance of sampling bias 
determining our results because (i) we were testing interactions and not main effects, and (ii) 
participants from both studies were from similar samples (i.e. students from Cardiff 
University). This analysis revealed a significant three-way interaction between task (scalar vs 
free choice), sentence type (control vs experimental sentence) and interpretation (literal vs 
free choice), χ2 (1) = 23.56, p < .001, β = 0.075, SE = 0.018, t = 4.15, just as we found in 
Experiment 3. Furthermore, the 2 by 2 task (scalar vs free choice) by interpretation (literal vs 
free choice) interaction, restricted to experimental conditions, was then also significant, χ2 (1) 
= 9.65, p  = .0033, β = 0.044, SE = 0.015, t = 2.97 
There were no effects of order involving interpretation in Experiment 3, χ2 (1)  < 2.40, 
p’s > .31, nor a main effect of order, χ2 < 1. However, there was an order by task interaction, 
χ2 (1) = 6.38, p = .011, β = 0.052, SE = 0.020, t = 2.71, such that participants completed the 
scalar task more quickly when they completed it second compared to when they completed it 
first, but no effect was observed for the free choice task. 
4.6 Discussion 
In Experiment 3 we found that scalar implicature interpretations needed more time to 
verify than corresponding literal interpretations, relative to the control sentences. This result 
replicates previous findings but with a new design using a cover story and more natural 
sounding sentences. We also found that free choice interpretations were verified just as 
quickly as corresponding literal interpretations. Most importantly, we observed a significant 
interaction across task, interpretation and control conditions, demonstrating that the difference 
between the inference and literal interpretations for scalar implicature sentences was greater 
than the difference between inference and literal interpretations for free choice sentences, 
relative to control sentences. Significant interactions were also observed between the scalar 
task of Experiment 3 and the free choice task of Experiment 2. These results are inconsistent 
with a processing model of free choice that assumes that free choice inferences are 
particularly complex, or double, scalar implicatures. Such an account would predict a greater 
cost to deriving free choice inferences than scalar implicatures.  
5. Experiment 4 
In our final experiment we tested whether the proportion of free choice inferences was 
reduced when participants had a small time window in which to process the sentences. Our 
design follows Bott and Noveck (2004), Experiment 4, in which participants received either 
900ms (short lag) or 3000ms (long lag) to verify the sentences. Bott and Noveck observed 
that the proportion of scalar implicature responses increased from 0.28 in the short lag to 0.44 
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in the long lag. If free choice inferences are complex scalar implicatures, the reduction in free 
choice inferences from the long lag to the short lag should be at least as much as that observed 
by Bott and Noveck.  
Participants performed a sentence verification task similar to Experiment 1. The crucial 
difference was that participants were required to respond at a specific time after the onset of 
the final sentence segment (e.g., “a hammer or a lion”). Participants saw the sentence 
presented in the centre of the screen and then waited until a set of exclamation marks 
appeared (the deadline, “!!!!”). They then had to make their response immediately after the 
deadline. For one group of participants the deadline occurred after 1000ms (the short lag 
group), and for the other group of participants, the deadline occurred after 3000ms (the long 
lag group). 
The variable of interest in this experiment was the change in proportion of inference 
responses across the lag manipulation, just as it was in Bott and Noveck (2004). Participants 
were therefore not given feedback on experimental sentences in the practice phase (c.f. 
Experiments 2 and 3). 
5.1 Method 
5.1.1 Participants 
Eighty-six participants completed the study for course credit or payment. Seven 
participants were removed for having poor accuracy or timing performance (see below). Forty 
participants remained in the short-lag condition and 39 in the long lag condition.  
5.1.2 Design, Materials and Procedure 
There were three phases to the experiment. The first was a practice phase, similar to that 
of Experiment 1, in which participants judged control sentences and received feedback on 
whether they were correct. This allowed them to consolidate the cover story and get general 
practice with the task. The second was a practice phase to familiarize participants with the 
deadline procedure, and the third was the experimental phase. 
Participants saw sentences presented in the centre of the screen in the same manner as 
Experiment 1. During the deadline practice phase and the experimental phase, participants 
were told to respond within 500ms of the signal and not before the signal. On each trial they 
received one of three types of feedback. If their response was on time, the response time was 
displayed on the screen, e.g., “235ms”. If they had made an anticipatory response (before the 
signal or up to 100ms after the signal), they saw a message reading, “too quick”, and if they 
had responded late (more than 500ms after the signal), they saw a message reading, “too 
slow.” They did not receive feedback on whether the true/false response was correct or 
incorrect.  
Participants judged double control sentences (true and false) and experimental sentences 
(see Table 1). We did not include single control sentences because they contained fewer 
words than the other types of sentences and the effect of the lag manipulation would have 
been difficult to interpret. Forty double control sentences were used in the first practice phase 
and 40 in the deadline practice phase. There were 80 sentences in the experimental phase, 40 
of which were double control sentences and 40 were experimental sentences. The sentences 
were constructed in the same way as in Experiment 1. 
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5.2 Results 
5.2.1 Preprocessing 
Participants were removed from the analysis if they responded with less than 50% 
responses in time (3 participants) or if they were less than 50% accurate in the control 
conditions (5 participants). 
We also removed all responses that were outside the response window (100ms-500ms 
after the deadline signal). This accounted for 17% of the data. The qualitative conclusions of 
the experiment are similar regardless of whether this data is excluded, however. 
5.2.2 Analysis 
The choice proportions are shown in Figure 4. Accuracy dropped from the long lag to 
the short lag for true control sentences, Ml = 0.90 (SD = 0.087) vs Ms  = 0.84 (SD = 0.11), χ2 
(1)  = 4.28, p = 0.039, β = 0.56, SE = 0.25, t =2.22, and false control sentences Ml = 0.93 (SD 
= 0.079) vs Ms  = 0.82 (SD = 0.12), χ2 (1)  = 20.39, p < 0.001, β = 1.33, SE = 0.25, t = 5.26, 
but not for the experimental sentences, Ml = 0. 70 (SD = 0.37) vs Ms  = 0.72 (SD = 0.31), χ2  < 
1, contrary to the scalar account of free choice inference. 
The scalar implicature explanation for free choice inferences predicts that the rate of 
free choice responding should fall from the long lag to the short lag (not remain constant or 
increase). More precisely, Bott & Noveck (2004) observed that for scalar implicatures, the 
proportion of inference responses decreased from 0.44 in the long lag to 0.28 in the short lag. 
If free choice is indeed a complex scalar implicature, we should have observed an effect at 
least as large as Bott & Noveck and in the same direction. To test whether our effect (+0.02) 
was significantly different to that of Bott and Noveck (-0.16), we examined confidence 
intervals around the difference between the short and long lag means in our experimental 
sentences. This revealed that Bott & Noveck’s effect, logit (0.16) = 1.66, fell outside our 
confidence intervals: M =0.0015, 95% CI (2-tailed), [-1.26,1.27] (using the standard error 
around the parameter estimates and assuming a normal approximation). We can thus be 
confident that any likely effect of the lag on the experimental sentences is less than the effect 
observed by Bott and Noveck, contrary to the free choice as complex scalar implicature 
hypothesis. 
5.3 Discussion 
If free choice inferences behave like scalar implicatures, the rate of free choice 
responding should decrease when participants are given a restricted processing time 
(following Bott & Noveck, 2004). We did not observe this pattern of results: the proportion of 
free choice inferences stayed more or less constant across the short and long lag conditions, 
whereas accuracy dropped significantly in the control conditions. Our data therefore provide 
further evidence against the scalar implicature account of free choice. 
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Figure 4. Choice proportions in Experiment 4. Double false and double true correspond to the 
control conditions. Error bars are the standard error of the mean. 
 
6. General Discussion 
According to recent theories (see section 1.3), free choice inferences are best analyzed as 
an extreme case of scalar implicatures. Consequently, the standard cost found for deriving a 
scalar implicature should be amplified. Yet, we found evidence for a reverse cost: not 
deriving a free choice inference is a costly phenomenon. This result argues against the 
otherwise parsimonious and widespread views that offer a single analysis for the two 
phenomena. We next discuss issues related to the methodology, before turning to the source 
of our effect and its implications for free choice theories. 
6.1 Sentence verification tasks 
We used a sentence verification task to measure full sentence reading times to free choice 
and literal interpretations. As with any methodology, there are some limitations to the 
conclusions that can be drawn. Here we discuss what those might be. 
One potential criticism of the sentence verification task is that unconstrained verification 
times, such as we used, do not separate speed from accuracy with sufficient clarity to 
conclude that we were measuring speed of processing alone. For example, if there were a 
lower probability of retrieving the correct verification response for literal interpretations, 
participants may have delayed responding in order to maximize the accuracy (e.g., McElree & 
Nordlie, 1999, show that responses to metaphors might be delayed for this reason). A speed-
accuracy trade-off (SAT) explanation seems unlikely to explain all of our results, however. 
First, participants would have had to have opposing response criteria and biases across our 
free choice tasks compared to our scalar implicature task or that of Bott and Noveck in order 
to explain the opposing pattern of results. Moreover, Bott et al. (2012) showed that the effects 
observed by Bott and Noveck could not be explained using SAT strategies. Since the two 
tasks were similar in many ways, it seems unlikely that SAT strategies could explain the 
difference we observe between free choice inferences and scalar implicatures. Second, we can 
see no reason why there would be a lower probability of correctly retrieving the literal 
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interpretation; the informativeness and verification requirements are in fact lower in the literal 
interpretation than in the free choice interpretation, exactly as for scalar implicatures.  
A further difficulty with sentence verification tasks is that it is sometimes difficult to 
know why participants reject sentences. Perhaps participants were not rejecting the 
experimental sentences because they derived the free choice interpretation, but for some other 
reason. In which case the comparison between true and false was not a comparison between 
literal and free choice interpretations, as we have maintained, but between literal and general 
rejection. One possibility is that participants were rejecting statements because they did not 
make sense. For example, they may have been able to see both interpretations of the sentence 
and therefore rejected it because it was ambiguous. There are several arguments against this 
however. First, rejected sentences (false) interpretations were never slower than true 
interpretations whereas judging ambiguous sentences (and therefore responding false) might 
be expected to take longer than judging normal, or non-ambiguous, sentences. Second, 
accuracy to the experimental sentences in the free choice condition was generally very high 
(M > 0.93 across both experiments). It seems unlikely that participants felt the sentences were 
ambiguous by the end of the training phase, given that they performed at such high levels of 
accuracy. Alternatively, one may argue that participants felt that the target sentences are 
ambiguous and recalled from the training phase that they should say false/true to ambiguous 
sentences. However, this possibility would not explain the current results and in particular the 
inverse mapping between false/true responses and short/long response times for free choice 
and scalar implicatures. Finally, if participants were rejecting sentences because they were 
underinformative or ambiguous, similar results would be expected for scalar implicature 
studies (underinformative sentences were rejected because they were infelicitous, say); yet we 
found the reverse pattern.  
Finally, sentence verification tasks that use materials with a restricted range of sentence 
frames and target words, such as those in our study, are prone to participants noticing 
regularities in the sentences and developing nonlinguistic strategies. While we cannot 
eliminate the possibility of participants using nonlinguistic strategies, we note several factors 
that make it less likely that they were doing so: (1) we obtained the same pattern of results 
across a range of paradigms, that is, participants freely choosing the or interpretation 
(Experiment 1), being trained on one or the other interpretation (Experiment 2), and 
responding under restricted response times (Experiment 4). The results cannot therefore be 
explained by strategies being invoked by particular methods, e.g., feedback; (2) our 
experiments all involved a cover story, rather than general knowledge, which made the task 
relatively taxing and thus more difficult to form the abstract knowledge necessary for a 
strategy (c.f. Bott and Noveck, 2004); and (3) we cannot identify a strategy that would enable 
participants to perform accurately on the experimental sentences and the control sentences 
(participants who scored badly on the control sentences were removed), whilst also explaining 
our processing results. For example, it was suggested to us that participants with a free choice 
interpretation may be looking for false disjuncts and saying false as soon as they find one, 
while participants with a literal interpretation may be looking for a true disjunct and saying 
true as soon as they find one. While being consistent with the observed accuracy on controls 
and experimental sentences (indeed, the strategy is indistinguishable from one based on the 
meaning of or), the strategy fails to explain why we observed response time interactions 
between true and false control sentences and true and false experimental sentences.  
In summary, while there are difficulties with sentence verification tasks, the range of 
techniques we have applied and the comparison between scalar implicatures and free choice 
have protected us from the most serious issues. More generally, we hope that more 
sophisticated techniques will be applied in the future to confirm and extend our findings, just 
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as has been the case in scalar implicatures (following the simple sentence verification task 
used by Bott & Noveck, 2004, many other researchers used other techniques: Breheny et al., 
2005, used self-paced reading; Bott et al., 2012, used SAT; Huang & Snedeker, 2009, used 
visual world; Shetreet, Chierchia & Gaab, 2013, used fMRI; Tomlinson et al., 2013, used 
mouse-tracking).  
6.2 Extending a paradigm: Truth value judgments and world-knowledge 
Throughout this paper, we have made heavy use of the paradigm proposed by Bott and 
Noveck (2001) to study scalar implicatures. Their paradigm can be used to study the 
processing aspects of mechanisms that create alternative readings for a given sentence, just 
like scalar implicature enrichment mechanisms create new interpretations. The design is based 
on situations such that truth value judgments could serve as a signal for which of two readings 
has been derived. In their original study, Bott and Noveck used sentences such that world 
knowledge would make the two target readings have different truth values. But this 
manipulation constrained the sentences one can test. By playing with contextual information 
rather than relying on world knowledge we relaxed these constraints and showed that the 
same paradigm could be applied to study free choice inferences, and should be apply to study 
more phenomena (see Chemla and Bott, 2013 for an application to presuppositions).  
In fact, the constraints imposed by world knowledge were problematic for scalar 
implicatures themselves, because the constraints on the stimuli led to the construction of odd 
sentences (e.g., some elephants are mammals). In Experiment 3, we used our contextual 
information manipulation to study scalar implicatures, and were able to replicate the well-
known results about scalar implicatures with sentences which did not suffer from the same 
type of oddness (e.g., some eagles were saved). 
6.3 Understanding the cost 
In this section we discuss why we observed a cost to free choice responding. We make 
one precautionary note with respect to the interpretation of our study however. The study was 
designed to investigate the comparison between scalar implicatures and free choice 
interpretations, and not to investigate free choice per se. While our data categorically 
demonstrates that processing free choice is not like processing scalar implicatures, the data 
concerning whether free choice or is faster than literal or is more debatable. Across all four 
experiments we have shown that the size of any possible free choice cost is small relative to 
that predicted by scalar implicature account, which evidences our principle argument about 
the comparison, but whether significantly faster free choice responses are observed seems to 
depend on idiosyncratic factors (e.g., proportion of true and false responses). We feel that our 
data is highly suggestive of faster free choice than literal or, and this is how we continue the 
discussion, but it is possible that there is a small (and so far non-detectible) cost of free choice 
interpretations. 
A faster free choice interpretation can be explained in two ways. First, free choice could 
be accessed before the literal meaning. (We are not assuming that the literal meaning is not 
computed along the way, but only that it is not a viable final option before free choice has 
been entertained). Perhaps the free choice interpretation is always derived and the processor 
sometimes enriches (or rejects) it and proceeds to derive the literal interpretation. Under this 
account, there is a cost associated with the literal interpretation because there is an extra 
processing stage involved in deriving the literal meaning. 
The alternative is that readings are not accessed in this serial fashion. Specifically, it may 
be that one of them is accessed on each occasion, probabilistically or based on independent 
contextual considerations (as a constraint-based model might predict, e.g., MacDonald, 
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Pearlmutter, Seidenberg, 1994). The kind of effect we found could then emerge because the 
evaluation of one reading would be a more complex task than the same evaluation of the other 
reading. In our case, it may be faster to assess the truth value of the free choice reading. 
However, we see no independent reason for this, for example there is no sense in which free 
choice contains less information than non free choice. The formal relation between the two 
readings is the same as for scalar implicatures (the literal meaning in both cases is entailed by 
the other reading); yet the effect is the reverse. Similarly, one might argue the two meanings 
are accessed at the same time and the faster response times for free choice inferences are 
observed because there is a stronger preference for free choice overall. However, in 
Experiments 2 and 3, participants were provided with a context (training) to ensure that 
preference towards the literal and free choice interpretations respectively was approximately 
the same (>90% accurate responses in both conditions), yet we observed faster response times 
to the free choice interpretation. Furthermore, Experiment 4 demonstrated that after 1000ms 
there was an equally strong preference (70%) for free choice (inference) as there was for 
literal scalar implicature interpretations (72% in Bott & Noveck, 2004, Experiment 4). The 
time course of the emerging preferences therefore seems to be reversed for the free choice 
sentences relative to the scalar implicatures, just as with the reaction time analysis. 
We are not in a position to make any stronger claims about the source of the free choice 
effect. In fact, despite the numbers of methodologies that have been used to study the scalar 
implicature effect, it is still debated what the source of the effect is (see Bott et al. 2012, 
Tomlinson et al., 2013, and Degen & Tanenhaus, under review, for a discussion of the sources 
of processing delay, and Katsos & Bishop, 2011, for discussions of the developmental delay). 
We hope that further techniques will be applied to get a finer-grained description of the 
processing pattern. What is important for our conclusion is the comparison between free 
choice and scalar implicatures and not on the individual explanations of their time course.  
6.4 Implications for theories of Free Choice 
The discrepancy between free choice and scalar implicatures argues against the otherwise 
parsimonious and widespread views that offer a single analysis for the two phenomena. In 
fact, they may favor views of free choice that require a reanalysis of more basic linguistic 
units such as disjunctions, conjunctions, epistemic and deontic modals, existential quantifiers, 
etc. (see section 1.3). Investigating the consequences for each of these alternatives would 
require cashing out the predictions they may offer about the relative order of the literal and 
free choice readings. It is not sufficient for an account to say that free choice inferences are 
part of the literal meaning, any account must explain how both readings are derived, and that 
the free choice reading should not come with a delay. 
Instead of exhaustively reviewing existing formal accounts of free choice and confront 
each with our processing results (quite a challenging task in general), we would like to focus 
our discussion on scalar implicature accounts of free choice, which are our main target for 
these studies. This will lead us to discuss refinements of previous interpretations of other 
experimental results, and to finer distinction between recent approaches. 
One may consider that the source of the cost to derive a scalar implicature corresponds to 
the relative (un)availability of alternatives. Specifically, one may need time to compute a 
scalar implicature not because the underlying Gricean-like reasoning requires time, but 
because it requires time to come to consider the relevant alternatives. One indirect argument 
for such a view comes from acquisition data. Children have been found to have difficulties 
with SIs, but these difficulties are reduced when alternatives are given to them explicitly 
(Gualmini et al., 2001). If that is the case, it is important to notice that the alternatives needed 
to derive free choice inferences are not only no more complex than the utterance (c.f. some 
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and all), but they are actually simpler than the utterance; in fact, they are contained in the 
original utterance (see Katzir, 2007 for considerations about how complexity enters in the 
determination of alternatives). Schematically, we are considering sentences of the form “A or 
B”, and the two relevant alternatives are simply the A part and the B part (see 9a-b). This is 
very different from regular scalar implicatures for which a lexical item is replaced by another. 
From this perspective, one may argue that scalar implicatures could give rise to a delay only if 
the alternatives involved are complex enough, i.e. in the some case but not in our free choice 
situations. This discussion reveals that, as of now, it is not decided what is the source of the 
time course we observe for scalar implicatures, let alone for other less studied pragmatic 
inferences such as free choice. 
On the theoretical side, it is possible to capitalize on the similarities between free choice 
and scalar implicatures without equating them on processing grounds. More precisely, we 
have presented a view according to which free choice is an extreme case of a scalar 
implicature (a “double” scalar implicature, in a way, see Fox, 2007, and Franke, 2011, most 
explicitly). Building on the resemblance between the two phenomena (their cancelability, 
their properties under embedding, etc.), one may rather build a theory in which scalar 
implicatures are an extreme case of free choice, or in which the two sisters share a common 
root, but end up lying at the end of different branches. Although it would be out of place to 
develop this theory here, it is worth noting that Chemla (2008, 2010) is an instance of the 
latter kind of theory. In this approach, the common root of scalar implicatures and free choice 
is some abstract reasoning about alternatives. But the structure of the alternatives in the two 
cases (either simply “all” for the “some” scalar implicatures, or two parallel disjuncts “A” and 
“B”, in the case of free choice for disjunctions “A or B”) leads to quite different 
computations. In a nutshell, for scalar implicatures, the alternative (“all”) is negated, while for 
free choice, the two disjuncts are understood to have the same truth-value, and it does not rely 
on second-order implicatures. If it can be shown that the free choice type of computation is 
simpler than the “some/all” type, or if there is something to the discussion above about the 
role of the availability and complexity of the alternatives, then some unified approaches to 
scalar implicatures may remain serious contenders.10  
7. Conclusion 
Natural languages offer several means to manipulate and convey information. 
Accordingly, linguists and philosophers have described and classified diverse types of 
expressions and constructions that give rise to inferences that differ in nature. This 
classification is a representation of the underlying mechanisms that must be postulated to 
derive such and such inference (e.g., grammatical rules of composition, Gricean maxims). 
The resulting typology has been mostly defended on the basis of “offline” data (e.g., the 
plausibility of such and such discourse). We showed however that prominent theories lead to 
natural processing predictions. That is the case for instance for so-called free choice 
inferences. Free choice is of crucial importance to understand the way basic operations like 
disjunction and conjunction work in natural languages, because it challenges mainstream (and 
natural) hypotheses about these operators. As a solution to this puzzle, free choice is 
prominently assimilated to scalar implicatures. The consequence is that free choice should 
behave like scalar implicatures on processing grounds (as well as on offline data). We have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Interestingly, the same processing pattern that we report for free choice has been found for 
presuppositions (Chemla & Bott, 2011). It is worth mentioning that Chemla (2008, 2010) offers a theory of 
presupposition as well, and the results align well with the picture that emerges from processing results: free 
choice and presuppositions rely on alternatives that are strictly simpler than the original utterance, while the 
alternatives involved in regular scalar implicatures are of equal complexity as the original utterance. 
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tested and invalidated this prediction. At the very least, our results place constraints on the 
adequate theory of free choice, both when it comes to formal modeling and to processing 
implementation. 
Methodologically, we showed how to use processing data to inform linguistic 
classification enterprises. It requires both a careful examination of modern linguistic theories 
and a realization of their predictions at a cognitively relevant level. Unfortunately, specific 
cognitive implementations of formal theories are often missing or highly underspecified. By 
targeting comparisons between different types of inferences, however, progress can be made 
on the classification task without being committed to distort the formal models or post-hoc 
cognitive reconstructions of them. 
Acknowledgments 
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research 
Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013) / ERC 
Grant Agreement n.313610 and was supported by ANR-10-IDEX-0001-02 and ANR-10-
LABX-0087. 
References  
Alonso-Ovalle, L. (2008). Innocent exclusion in an alternative-semantics. Natural Language 
Semantics 16(2). 115–128. doi:10.1007/s11050-008-9027- 1. 
Baayen, R.H., Davidson, D.J. & Bates, D.M. (2008) Mixed-effects modeling with crossed 
random effects for subjects and items. Journal of Memory and Language, 59, 390-412. 
Bott, L., Bailey, T.M, Grodner, D. (2012). Distinguishing speed from accuracy in scalar 
implicatures. Journal of Memory and Language, 66, 123-142. DOI: 
10.1016/j.jml.2011.09.005 
Bott, L., Frisson, S. & Murphy, G. L. (2008). Interpreting conjunctions. Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 62, 681-706. 
Bott, L., & Noveck, I.A. (2004) Some utterances are underinformative: The onset and time 
course of scalar inferences. Journal of Memory and Language, 51, 437–457. 
Breheny, R., Katsos, N., & Williams, J. (2006) Are generalised scalar implicatures generated 
by default? An on-line investigation into the role of context in generating pragmatic 
inferences. Cognition, 100,434–463. 
Chemla, E. (2008) Présuppositions et implicatures scalaires: études formelles et 
expérimentales. EHESS Dissertation. 
Chemla, E. (2010) Similarity: Towards a unified account of scalar implicatures, free choice 
permission and presupposition projection. Under revision for Semantics and Pragmatics.  
Chemla, E. & Bott, L. (2013) Processing presuppositions: dynamic semantics vs pragmatic 
enrichment. Language and Cognitive Processes, 28(3), 241-260. 
Chevallier, C., Noveck, I.A., Nazir, T., Bott, L., Lanzetti, V., Sperber, D. (2008). Making 
disjunctions exclusive. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 61, 1751-60. 
Chierchia, G. (2004). Scalar implicatures, polarity phenomena, and the syntax/pragmatics 
interface. In Belletti, A., editor, Structures and Beyond. Oxford University Press. 
Chierchia, G., Fox, D., and Spector, B. (2008). The grammatical view of scalar implicatures 
and the relationship between semantics and pragmatics. In Maienborn, C., von Heusinger, 
K., and Portner, P., editors, An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning. 
Mouton de Gruyter. 
Degen, J. and Tanenhaus, M.K. (under review). Processing scalar implicature: A constraint-
based approach.  
http://www.bcs.rochester.edu/people/jdegen/docs/DegenTanenhaus_underreview.pdf 
	  	   30	  
Ducrot, O. (1969). Présupposés et sous-entendus. Langue Française, 4:30–43. 
Grodner, D., Klein, N. M., Carbary, K. M., & Tanenhaus, M. K. (2010). ‘‘Some”, and 
possibly all, scalar inferences are not delayed: Evidence for immediate pragmatic 
enrichment. Cognition, 116, 42–55. 
Fox, D. (2007). Free Choice and the theory of Scalar Implicatures. In Sauerland, U. and 
Stateva, P., editors, Presupposition and Implicature in Compositional Semantics, pages 
537–586. New York, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Franke, M. (2011). Quantity implicatures, exhaustive interpretation, and rational 
conversation. Semantics and Pragmatics, 4(1):1–82. 
Geurts, B. (2005). Entertaining alternatives: Disjunctions as modals. Natural Language 
Semantics 13(4). 383–410. doi:10.1007/s11050-005-2052-4. 
Grice, H.P. (1975). Logic and conversation. Syntax and Semantics, 3(S 41):58. 
Gualmini, A., Crain, S., Meroni, L., Chierchia, G. & Guasti, M.T. (2001). At the 
semantics/pragmatics interface in child language. In Proceedings of Semantics and 
Linguistic Theory XI, Cornell, Ithaca: CLC Publications. 
Horn, L. R. (1989). A natural history of negation. University of Chicago Press Chicago. 
Huang, Y. & Snedeker, J. (2009) Online interpretation of scalar quantifiers: Insight into the 
semantics–pragmatics interface. Cognitive Psychology, 58, 376–415. 
Katzir, R. (2007). Structurally-defined alternatives. Linguistics and Philosophy 30(6). 669–
690. doi:10.1007/s10988-008-9029-y. 
Kamp, H. (1973). Free choice permission. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74. 57–74. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4544849. 
Kamp, H. (1978). Semantics versus pragmatics. In Franz Guenthner & Siegfried Josef 
Schmidt (eds.), Formal semantics and pragmatics for natural languages, 255–287. 
Dordrecht: Reidel.Levinson, S. C. (2000). Presumptive meanings: The theory of 
generalized conversational implicature. MIT Press Cambridge, MA, USA. 
Katsos, N. & Bishop, D. V. M. (2011). Pragmatic tolerance: implications for the acquisition 
of informativeness and implicature. Cognition, 120: 67-81. 
Katsos, N. and Cummins, C. (2010). Pragmatics: From theory to experiment and back again. 
Language and Linguistics Compass, 4:282–295. 
Klinedinst, N. (2006). Plurality and possibility. Los Angeles: University of California, Los 
Angeles dissertation. 
Kratzer, A. and Shimoyama, J. (2002). Indeterminate pronouns: The view from Japanese. In 
Yukio Otsu (ed.), Proceeding of the 3rd Tokyo conference on psycholinguistics, 1–25. 
Lewis, D. (1979). A problem about permission. As reprinted in Lewis (2000): 20–33. 
Lewis, D. (2000). Papers in ethics and social philosophy. Cambridge studies in philosophy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Magri, G. (2009). A theory of individual-level predicates based on blind mandatory scalar 
implicatures. Natural Language Semantics, 17(3), 245-297. 
MacDonald, M. C., Pearlmutter, N. J., & Seidenberg, M. S. (1994). Lexical nature of 
syntactic ambiguity resolution. Psychological Review, 101 (4), 676 - 703. 
McElree, B. (1993). The locus of lexical preference effects in sentence comprehension: A 
time-course analysis. Journal of Memory and Language, 32, 536-571. 
McElree, B., & Nordlie, J. (1999). Literal and figurative interpretations are computed in equal 
time. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 6, 486-494. 
Giorgio Magri. A theory of individual level predicates based on blind mandatory scalar 
implicatures. Natural Language Semantics, 17:245–297, 2009. 
Noveck, I. A. and Posada, A. (2003). Characterizing the time course of an implicature: An 
evoked potentials study. Brain and Language, 85(2). 
	  	   31	  
Nieuwland, M. S., Ditman, T., & Kuperberg, G. R. (2010). On the incrementality of 
pragmatic processing: An ERP investigation of informativeness and pragmatic abilities. 
Journal of Memory and Language, 63, 324–346. 
van Rooij, R. and Schulz, K. (2004). Exhaustive Interpretation of Complex Sentences. 
Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 13(4):491–519. 
van Rooij, R. (2006). Free Choice Counterfactual Donkeys. Journal of Semantics, 23(4). 383-
402. 
Sauerland, U. (2004). Scalar Implicatures in Complex Sentences. Linguistics and Philosophy, 
27(3):367–391. 
Schulz, K. (2005). A pragmatic solution for the paradox of free choice permission. Synthese 
147(2). 343–377. doi:10.1007/s11229-005-1353-y. 
Shetreet, E, Chierchia, C., & Gaab, N. (2013). When some is not every: Dissociating scalar 
implicature generation and mismatch. Human Brain Mapping. DOI: 10.1002/hbm.22269 
Simons, M. (2005). Dividing things up: The semantics of or and the modal/or interaction. 
Natural Language Semantics 13(3). 271–316. 
Spector, B. (2003). Scalar implicatures: Exhaustivity and Gricean reasoning. In ten Cate, B., 
editor, Proceedings of the Eigth ESSLLI Student Session, Vienna, Austria. Revised 
version in Spector (2007). 
Spector, B. (2007). Scalar implicatures: Exhaustivity and Gricean reasoning. In Aloni, M., 
Dekker, P., and Butler, A., editors, Questions in Dynamic Semantics, volume 17 of 
Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface, pages 225–249. Elsevier. 
Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. (1995). Relevance: Communication and cognition. Oxford: 
Blackwell; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U. P. 
Tomlinson, J. M., Bailey, T. M. & Bott, L. (2013). Possibly all of that and then some: Scalar 
implicatures are understood in two steps. Journal of Memory and Language, 89(1), 18-35. 
doi: 10.1016/j.jml.2013.02.003. 
Veltman, F. (1996). Defaults in update semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25:221-
261. 
Zimmermann, T.E. (2000). Free choice disjunction and epistemic possibility. Natural 
Language Semantics 8(4). 255–290. doi:10.1023/A:1011255819284. 
